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INTRODUCTION 
I am truly delighted that Boston University School of Law is hosting a 
conference on Abner Greene’s Against Obligation1 and Michael Seidman’s On 
Constitutional Disobedience.2 Both books launch powerful and much-needed 
broadsides against the idea of a political obligation to obey the U.S. 
Constitution, and more generally (whether or not the authors embrace these 
implications) against the very idea of a political obligation to obey state 
authorities. I fully agree with both authors that the arguments normally made in 
favor of a duty of obedience to the Constitution, and by extension to state 
authorities of any kind, are remarkably – and one might even say transparently 
– weak.3 I rather suspect that everyone knows this but prefers not to talk about 
it too much in polite company. 
That weakness should not be surprising, especially in the context of 
obedience to alleged constitutional authority. It is perhaps conceivable that an 
objectively correct moral theory could somehow lead to the conclusion that 
lockstep adherence to the Constitution of the United States is the optimum 
moral strategy at some given point in time.4 But any such argument, as is true 
of any moral argument of any kind on any subject, must begin with an 
objectively correct moral theory or the argument goes nowhere. Normative 
arguments without such an objectively correct foundation might or might not 
be fun or interesting to ponder, and could be rhetorically effective against (as 
Obi-Wan might say) the weak-minded, but they are intellectually empty. It is 
fair to say that no defenders of adherence to the Constitution of whom I am 
 
∗ Philip S. Beck Professor, Boston University School of Law. 
1 ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF AUTHORITY IN A 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2012). 
2 LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE (2012). 
3 See GREENE, supra note 1, at 2; SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 15. 
4 Indeed, outside the context of a scholarly discussion, where the standards of analytical 
rigor appropriate to the academic enterprise do not hold sway, I might even be tempted to 
make such an argument about fidelity to constitutional authority at the present moment in 
time, though it would be a very soft argument even if fully developed. 
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aware have successfully developed any such objectively true moral foundation 
for their normative claims,5 and accordingly those claims can appropriately be 
dismissed as hot gas. The same is true, of course, of legal academics who 
construct normative claims in defense of things other than adherence to the 
Constitution; without an objectively true moral theory to back them up, such 
claims must also be relegated to the upper atmosphere. The case against 
constitutional obligation – or more precisely against demonstrated 
constitutional obligation – is thus a particular application of the more general 
case against (demonstrated) political obligation. The moral of the story is 
simply that there is no good substitute for a foundationally sound argument, in 
normative political theory as in any other field. 
Professor Abner Greene pulls back from the full breadth of this conclusion.6 
He frames his attack on constitutional obligation as an attack on deference to 
original meaning rather than as an attack on deference to the Constitution as 
such. Professor Greene argues “against an obligation to interpret the 
Constitution on the basis of past sources of (purported) authority,”7 but he 
urges that his “position against diachronic commitmentarianism as a matter of 
constitutional interpretation does not extend to . . . an anti-constitutional 
position.”8 Rather, he argues, one can still have binding constitutional law 
“through understanding what the higher-law principles mean today, or during 
the current generation, rather than what they meant ages ago.”9 
All of this is true: one could certainly choose, as politically binding norms, 
current understandings of the Constitution. By the same token, one could also 
choose, as politically binding norms, current (or past) understandings of the 
United Nations charter, the Constitution of the Confederate States of America, 
or the Libertarian Party Platform of 1980. All of these documents, and many 
more besides, can serve as anchors for legal meaning, can be interpreted in 
either original or modern terms, and underwent some kind of ratification 
 
5 This certainly does not mean that it cannot be done. I am an objectivist – in both the 
small “o” and large “O” senses of that term – and believe quite firmly in foundationally 
grounded moral truths. It means only that no such development has yet been forthcoming in 
the relevant legal scholarship. 
6 In focusing my attention on Professor Greene, I mean no slight to Professor Seidman. 
Quite to the contrary: I am not discussing Professor Seidman’s book because I agree with 
too much of it to offer any useful comments. Indeed, I have found more with which to 
disagree in many works that I have authored than I find in On Constitutional Disobedience. 
I do not necessarily agree with Professor Seidman that non-constitutional normative 
discourse is likely to be any better than constitutionally grounded normative discourse, see 
SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 9; hot gas is hot gas whether or not it has the word 
“constitutional” somewhere nearby. But he is right that constitutional discourse, whenever it 
ventures beyond positive statements about meaning, is generally of little value. See id. at 
141-42. 
7 GREENE, supra note 1, at 206. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 207. 
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process. If the goal is broadly to bind “the day-to-day lawmaking and 
execution of our agents through higher-law constitutional principles,”10 then 
even assuming (contra Professor Seidman) that one requires a text, or even a 
ratified text, for this task, there is nothing in Professor Greene’s book to 
explain why that text needs to be the Constitution of the United States.11 
Professor Greene knows all of this perfectly well. “There is a separate 
question,” he observes, “why this particular constitutional text should matter to 
anyone.”12 His answer to this crucial question is twofold. First, he suggests that 
even if there is no general reason to pay attention to the Constitution, “[s]ome 
aspects of our Constitution . . . may be defensible as a retail matter.”13 But if 
true, that would only justify following those specifically defensible provisions, 
perhaps even by incorporating them into a new document. It says nothing 
about the normative merit of following the Constitution qua the Constitution. 
Indeed, those provisions’ presence in the Constitution would be utterly 
irrelevant to their justification: whether the provisions are justified on either 
moral or coordination-based grounds,14 those grounds operate independently of 
the existence, much less the authority, vel non of the Constitution as an 
integrated document. Provisions adopted retail might just as well be found in 
the Confederate Constitution (which actually contains most of the provisions 
also found in the U.S. Constitution), in a fortune cookie, or in Professor 
Greene’s scholarship. 
But of course people, both in and out of the academy, seem as an empirical 
matter to be more interested in the U.S. Constitution than in the Confederate 
Constitution, fortune cookies, or (no slight at all intended and hopefully none 
taken) Professor Greene’s scholarship. That leads to Professor Greene’s final 
justification for paying attention to the Constitution: it is simply a brute fact 
that people talk a lot about the Constitution, and that is enough to make the 
document relevant, at least for some purposes. He writes that “[w]e can 
witness the sociological fact of acceptance and compliance with the secondary 
rules of the Constitution and the primary rules enacted thereunder . . . . We can 
see these textual limits as our limits, and . . . proceed to the (admittedly 
complex) task of determining the meaning of the often abstract text.”15 
Here I think Professor Greene is on absolutely solid descriptive ground, but 
here is also where his argument against deference to originalism goes astray. 
Once one starts, for whatever reason, interpreting the Constitution 
(“determining the meaning of the often abstract text”), originalism takes over 
as the uniquely correct methodology. One can certainly reject originalism, but 
 
10 Id. 
11 See Gary Lawson, No History, No Certainty, No Legitimacy . . . No Problem: 
Originalism and the Limits of Legal Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1551, 1569-70 (2012). 
12 GREENE, supra note 1, at 208. 
13 Id. 
14 See id. 
15 Id. at 208-09. 
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then one must also reject the enterprise of constitutional interpretation (which 
is not at all necessarily a bad thing to do).16 That does not mean that one must 
decide real-world cases in accordance with the Constitution’s original 
meaning, because to say that originalism is the correct way to ascertain the 
Constitution’s meaning says nothing about whether one ought, as a normative 
matter, to act in deference to the Constitution’s meaning. Professor Greene is 
conflating questions of interpretation with questions of adjudication. 
In this brief Essay, I will first clarify the distinction between interpreting the 
Constitution and following the Constitution – a distinction that has bedeviled 
originalists at least as much as it bedevils Professor Greene. Sound 
interpretation involves the ascertainment of objective meaning; sound 
following of some normative guide, whether the Constitution or anything else, 
involves the ascertainment of objective moral truth. Those are very different 
intellectual enterprises calling for very different methods and skills. Second, I 
will try to explain why sound interpretation must consist of a search for 
original meaning. That is, if you want to follow the Constitution’s meaning, 
then, as a hypothetical imperative, you must follow the Constitution’s original 
(hypothetical public) meaning. Throwing out the originalist bathwater 
necessarily carries the constitutional baby in its wake. 
I. DISCOVERY AND DECISION 
Originalists as a class are notoriously obscure about exactly what 
originalism involves.17 Most of the scholarly attention has focused on figuring 
out whether originalism involves reference to the Framers’ intentions, the 
ratifiers’ intentions, actual public understandings, hypothetical public 
understandings, or some combination thereof – in other words, figuring out 
what kind of evidence counts (and how much it counts) toward establishing 
constitutional meaning.18 There is, however, a much more basic ambiguity 
 
16 Thus, I am among those referenced by Professor Greene who believe “that as a 
conceptual matter, the interpretation of legal text involves the unearthing of the purpose or 
intention of the framers/ratifiers of such text,” id. at 163, and that “[o]ne might engage in 
some other project in which one fleshes out (say) the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment without adherence to original understanding, but that project would 
not properly be called constitutional interpretation.” Id. This is all correct, with the very 
important proviso that the relevant authors (“framers/ratifiers”) whose intentions must be 
uncovered might well be hypothetical rather than historically real authors, so that the search 
for purpose or intention need not be a search for concrete mental states of actual people. 
Specifically, the relevant “thoughts” for constitutional interpretation are the “thoughts” of 
the hypothetical reasonable person of 1788. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism 
as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 48 (2006). 
17 As with virtually all class-wide generalizations, this one has its exceptions. Mike 
Paulsen and Steve Calabresi, among others, can consider themselves absolved. 
18 I have elsewhere argued to tedium that this investigation, while crucial, is radically 
incomplete, because any theory of interpretation must also prescribe a standard of proof that 
identifies how much evidence is necessary to support a truth claim about documentary 
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about originalism that is too often unrecognized even by originalists: is 
originalism a theory of interpretation or a theory of adjudication (or perhaps 
both)? The two can be, but need not be, contingently related, but they are quite 
different kinds of theories and involve quite different intellectual operations to 
develop properly.19 
Originalism-as-interpretation is a theory of meaning; originalism-as-
adjudication is a theory of action. Theories of meaning are evaluated by 
reference to positive criteria of accuracy in discerning communicative signals; 
theories of action are evaluated by reference to normative criteria of justice. 
Evidence for a conclusion under one of these kinds of originalism could, but 
certainly need not, constitute evidence for a conclusion under the other kind. 
And similarly, valid critiques of one kind of originalist operation could, but 
certainly need not, constitute valid critiques of the other. 
Professor Greene has ably pointed out that the standard normative 
arguments for originalism-as-adjudication – that is, for the proposition that 
real-world decisions should be made on the basis of attempts to discern the 
Constitution’s original public meaning – lack sound foundations.20 To be sure, 
those arguments are no worse than the arguments for anything-else-as-
adjudication that the legal academy has to offer, which also lack demonstrably 
sound foundations, but they are no better. What Professor Greene leaves out, 
however, is the crucial fact that much of the case for originalism-as-
adjudication is based upon normative claims about the appropriate roles of 
various decisionmaking institutions (usually, but not invariably, courts) rather 
than on deep theories of meaning or interpretation. Those normative claims 
could be advanced with utter confidence by someone who believes that 
originalism-as-interpretation is completely wrong as a theory of meaning, so 
criticizing those normative theories says nothing about the value of originalism 
as an interpretative method. 
Simply put, one need not believe that originalism is the best way to ascertain 
the Constitution’s meaning to believe that originalism is the best way to make 
normative operational decisions about governance under the Constitution, and 
vice versa. Indeed, given that all real-world normative decisions are made 
under quite serious constraints of time and resources, it would be surprising if 
the “best” adjudicative theory, however “best” is defined, involved 
straightforward application of any fully specified, analytically precise theory of 
interpretation rather than some stylized, simplified model that trades off some 
measure of interpretative accuracy (even by its own lights) for some measure 
of savings in decision costs. Accordingly, originalism-as-adjudication is very 
unlikely to replicate precisely the results from rigorous application of 
 
meaning. See Gary Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy: Its Cause and Cure, 19 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 411 (1996); Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859 (1992). 
19 The same confusions plague non-originalist theories as well, but they are not my 
concern. 
20 GREENE, supra note 1, at 162. 
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originalism-as-interpretation, even for those who subscribe to both kinds of 
theories. Interpreters in principle have unlimited time and resources to explore 
problems of meaning, and any given interpreter can always put off an ultimate 
decision or simply clear a path for future interpreters to pursue. Adjudicators 
have no such luxury. They have to decide, and they have to decide given 
strictly limited time and resources. Even a decision not to decide leaves the 
status quo in place and therefore amounts to a loss for the party seeking 
positive action from the adjudicator. Adjudicative theories therefore need 
decisionmaking tools as part of their arsenal that interpreters do not require. 
The task of devising a normatively sound adjudicative theory may or may not 
involve application of any particular interpretative theory, but it is virtually 
certain that it will not exclusively involve application of any particular 
interpretative theory, unless that interpretative theory completely specifies all 
of the normatively appropriate decision tools and explains how to trade them 
off against interpretative accuracy.21 
Similarly, signing onto originalism-as-interpretation does not, by itself, say 
anything at all about the normative desirability of signing onto originalism-as-
adjudication. To say that the Constitution means X does not entail that actors 
making decisions in the real world should act on the basis of X (or claim to be 
acting on the basis of X while really acting on the basis of Y). By the same 
token, one could think that originalism-as-interpretation is completely wrong 
as an interpretative theory but believe that adjudicative actors should behave as 
though it were true. Perhaps originalism-as-adjudication reaches better results, 
or has a better results-to-decision-costs ratio, than other theories that are 
interpretatively superior. As I have said elsewhere: 
One could perfectly well believe that originalism is the interpretatively 
correct way to understand the United States Constitution, but doubt 
whether decision makers (such as courts) should make real-world 
decisions based on that understanding. Similarly, one might believe that 
originalism is inferior to some other methodology as a tool for 
ascertaining constitutional meaning, but believe, for institutional and 
normative reasons, that it is the best tool for resolving real-world disputes 
in which the Constitution is invoked. And, of course, one might believe 
that originalism is both a sound interpretative methodology and an 
appropriate decision making tool – albeit for very different reasons.22 
And to complete the picture, one could, as I have already said here, believe 
that originalism-as-interpretation is correct and that originalism-as-
adjudication is also correct, but believe that the enterprise of adjudication 
 
21 I have argued elsewhere that originalism actually comes close to meeting this standard 
by interpretatively prescribing allocations of burdens of proof for adjudication, but does not 
quite close the deal because it cannot prescribe a standard of proof for interpretative claims. 
See Gary Lawson, Dead Document Walking, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1225 (2012); Lawson, Legal 
Indeterminacy, supra note 18. Nothing in my analysis here depends on that conclusion. 
22 Lawson, supra note 11, at 1155-56. 
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requires use of a modified rather than pure version of originalist interpretative 
theory if securing answers from the pure version of the theory is too costly. 
All of this means that Professor Greene’s critique of originalism-as-
adjudication says nothing whatsoever about whether originalism is the right 
way to interpret the Constitution. It says that advocates of originalism-as-
adjudication have not made their normative case, and that is true as far as it 
goes, but it is only true as far as it goes. Note that all of the arguments for an 
interpretative obligation to originalism that are addressed and rejected by 
Professor Greene – democratic legitimacy, citizen duty, and stability through 
settlement23 – are arguments for originalism-as-adjudication. And when 
Professor Greene challenges the notion – which I defend below – that 
interpretation must be originalist by definition, his challenge is grounded solely 
in normative concerns about adjudication.24 
In sum, Professor Greene has presented a powerful case against the 
arguments for originalism-as-adjudication that defenders of such a theory have 
put forward. But this is just a special case of the more general observation that 
normative arguments put forward by legal scholars are quite likely to be really 
lousy arguments.25 It leaves open whether constitutional interpretation, to be 
done well, must be originalist. 
II. WAS HUMPTY RIGHT ALL ALONG? 
Suppose that someone has written a document – let us say an agency 
agreement authorizing an agent to contract for the purchase of 10,000 
computer chips – in a foreign language, and we want to know what the 
document says. One solution is to summon a skilled interpreter. If that 
interpreter is doing his or her job well, he or she will attempt to discern the 
communicative intentions of the writing. The good interpreter will not attempt 
to reconstruct those intentions in light of modern problems or concerns, 
identify the highest aspirations that can be drawn from the writing, or try to 
integrate the document into a hypothetical chain novel over the course of 
generations. An interpreter who tried that kind of stunt would be fired on the 
spot. 
The fact that the document appears to be an agency instrument will establish 
certain background conventions and assumptions that presumptively frame the 
 
23 See GREENE, supra note 1, at 161-62. 
24 See id. at 163 (“One can’t simply posit that constitutional interpretation must be 
intentionalist in this way; one needs an argument, e.g., democratic theory requires 
interpreters, as agents, to adhere to framers’/ratifiers’, as principals, understanding, or, e.g., 
we must tether current interpreters to original understanding or else they will run riot with 
their own subjective conceptions of political justice.”). 
25 “It is conceivable that the ethical, epistemological, and metaphysical problems of the 
ages will be solved by an article in a[n] . . . English-language law journal. But I rather doubt 
it.” Gary Lawson, The Ethics of Insider Trading, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 727, 778 
(1988). 
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specific communications in the instrument. Agency instruments are typically 
written in a different style and with some different standard word usages than 
poems or shopping lists. Moreover, because the instrument is designed to 
inform people other than the author of the instructions given to the agent (it is 
not simply a memo to self or a diary entry), the natural assumption is that the 
communicative intention of the author is to employ the public meaning of the 
words used in the instrument. Perhaps the author of the document is an inept 
communicator and has failed utterly at this task, but that conclusion can only 
be reached after attempting to fit the document within the ordinary 
communicative conventions associated with agency instruments. And finally, 
if the “author” of the agency instrument is in fact a group of people rather than 
a single person, the conceptual problems associated with the idea of a “group 
mind” require that the instrument be read as though it was authored by a 
hypothetical single individual.26 
The bottom line is that when one is interpreting a document that appears to 
be an externally directed communicative instrument, the enterprise of 
interpretation entails discerning the public meaning of the document, where the 
idea of “public meaning” may call into play certain conventions appropriate to 
certain kinds of documents. To interpret a communicative instrument is to seek 
to ascertain its meaning. Otherwise, one simply is not engaged in the enterprise 
of interpretation. (There are many other enterprises beyond the ascertainment 
of meaning in which one can engage when confronted with a document, but 
they are not interpretation.) This seems uncontroversial in the case of virtually 
every document, including law review articles, which everyone in the legal 
academy ever encounters. Just imagine how one would “interpret” the Rhode 
Island corporate charter of 1663 if one wanted to write a research paper on the 
subject. That is how one interprets the U.S. Constitution of 1788. One employs 
a methodology of original public meaning. One can argue about various details 
of that methodology, and one can raise interesting (and perhaps difficult) 
empirical questions about the kinds of conventions that underlie various kinds 
of documents, but those arguments all take place within a broad framework of 
a search for the original public meaning. Of course, it is possible for the 
original public meaning of a document to instruct readers to apply some 
methodology other than original public meaning (“construe this agency 
instrument in light of whatever problems and concerns happen to exist at the 
moment of interpretation in order to achieve the broad purpose of securing the 
purchase of 10,000 computer chips”),27 but one would reach that conclusion by 
applying an original public meaning methodology in the first instance. 
 
26 For a more elaborate discussion of these basic principles of communication through 
the jointly authored written word, see Lawson & Seidman, supra note 16. 
27 See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A 
New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 
752 (2009). 
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All of this is in the form of a hypothetical imperative: if you want to know 
what an agency instrument (which the U.S. Constitution gives every indication 
of being28) means, then you employ a methodology of original public meaning. 
If you are doing something other than ascertaining meaning, perhaps other 
methods will serve those tasks better. But then one needs to identify those 
tasks. 
To be sure, sometimes interpreters are quite clearly called upon to employ 
methodologies other than the search for original public meaning to perform 
important tasks. When Pharaoh pulled Joseph from prison to interpret dreams, 
Pharaoh was not looking for someone to explain what kind of animal was 
represented by a mental image of suddenly cannibalistic bovines. The act of 
interpretation in that case was something quite different from the ascertainment 
of original public meaning. Agency instruments, though, are not dreams, and 
neither is the Constitution of the United States. If you want to know what 
instruments of that kind say, you must determine their original public meaning. 
Is this cheating? Am I just defining interpretation of a certain kind of 
document to be a search for original public meaning? I suppose so, though to 
be precise, I am defining good interpretation of a certain kind of document to 
be a search for original public meaning. One can always use the word 
“interpretation” to mean anything that one likes, including something other 
than a search for original public meaning, as long as the definition is made 
clear. My claim is only that if one is not searching for original public meaning, 
one will not accurately ascertain the meaning of the document. One will fail to 
participate successfully in the act of communication that the document is 
attempting to perform. It cannot be emphasized too often (I have learned) that 
there is no normative conclusion lurking in this simple observation. One can 
always choose to reject a document’s offer of communication, with no 
consequence more dramatic than an indication of a hint of rudeness to the 
author. But if one is not communicating, one is not ascertaining meaning. Here 
is the acid test of whether I am simply making up a fiat definition of meaning: 
if someone truly believes that the right way to ascertain the meaning of the 
Rhode Island corporate charter of 1663 is something other than the discovery 
of original public meaning, and would be willing to have their child turn in a 
research paper in a history class based on that other methodology, I will 
certainly listen to the argument. 
For Professor Greene, this means that if he wants constitutional meaning to 
be part of his project, he cannot dispense with originalism – not because we 
owe some cosmic moral debt to the past, but simply because that is how you 
 
28 I am profoundly indebted to Robert Natelson for this basic and crushingly powerful 
insight. The Constitution is not a statute, a treaty, a compact, or a chain novel. It is a power 
of attorney. For an introduction to the agency law understanding of the Constitution, see 
Robert G. Natelson, The Framing and Adoption of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in 
GARY LAWSON, GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, THE 
ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 84 (2010). 
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ascertain the meaning of a communicative instrument such as the Constitution. 
Without originalism, Professor Greene can perform many activities other than 
interpretation upon the Constitution (such as construction), or he can perform 
the activity of interpretation upon something other than the Constitution (such 
as some set of social practices). But the Constitution will still mean what it 
means. 
 
